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DANIEL KOSTI!
THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST 
PHYSICALISM AND THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS1
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I briefly 
outline the background of the problem, i.e. Kripke’s modal argument 
(Kripke 1980). In the second section I present Chalmers’ account of two-
dimensional semantics and two-dimensional argument against physicalism. 
In the third section I criticize Chalmers’ approach based on two crucial 
points, one is about necessity of identities and the other is about microphysi-
cal descriptions and a priori derivation.
1. 
The conceivability argument starts with the thesis to which a materi-
alist must be committed: if the mental states are identical to the brain states 
(P=Q), then a situation in which this identity falls apart should not be 
possible. This is so because, according to Kripke (Kripke 1980), all identity 
statements involving rigid designators, if true at all, must be necessary true. 
The conceivability arguments depart from the claim that a situation in which 
the brain states take place but phenomenal states are lacking altogether is 
conceivable. It is argued, then, if such a situation is conceivable, it is possi-
ble. Finally, if such a situation is possible, then it is metaphysically possible, 
1 I would like to thank Zivan Lazovic for very helpful and insightful comments on 
this paper. I am also indebted to Stephen Tiley for proofreading this paper and for 
providing very useful comments on it.
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because as we recall identity has to hold necessarily in order to be true. If 
this is the case then materialism is false.
Now, how do we come from a purely epistemic claim about what is 
conceivable to the modal claim about what is possible? 
According to Kripke, the only thing we need to make this step is a 
lack of contradiction in conceiving such a situation. Consider an example 
with the natural kinds terms. Namely, there is no contradiction in conceiving 
a situation in which water is not H2O. However, because “water” rigidly 
designates H2O, the argument actually shows that, although conceivable, it 
is not possible that water is not H2O. How does this step of the inference 
work? Since it is an empirical discovery that water is H2O, the reference of 
the identity statement is not fixed a priori. In other words, the state of affairs 
in our world might have been different, so water might have turned out to be 
something else in our world (depending on the actual empirical discovery). 
Therefore, there is nothing in our knowledge that would contradict the 
conceivability of the claim “water is something other than H2O”. Just to give 
a contrastive example, given the definition of a triangle, a geometrical figure 
that has three angles, it is neither a priori conceivable nor possible for a 
triangle to have four angles. 
Why does this step from conceivability to metaphysical possibility 
break down in the case of “water =H2O”? According to Kripke, it is because 
the reference of the concept of water is fixed to a microphysical description, 
which in our world is H2O. On the other hand, if it turned out that the 
microphysical description of water in our actual world was not H2O but 
something else, say XYZ, then the reference of “water” would be fixed to 
XYZ in the actual world. According to Kripke, rigid designation of natural 
kind terms is always tied to microphysical description2. This, on the other 
hand, means that whatever we discover at the microphysical level to play the 
role of water, fixes the reference of “water”. In a sense, it is not the empiri-
cal discovery that fixes the reference, because the reference is fixed before-
hand, but whatever we believe to play the role of water. This is how rigid 
designation of the natural kind terms actually works according to Kripke. 
Therefore, it is only conceivable that water might not have been H2O, but it 
is not possible. On the other hand, if some possible world at which water is 
not H2O, was actual, then “water is H2O” would be false considered from 
that world. And this is where the two-dimensional semantics steps in. 
2 Kripke (Kripke 1980) argues that rigid designators get their reference fixed by an 
act of “baptism”.  In the case of natural kinds the scientific community, for 
example, decides that the reference of certain concepts is tied to certain 
“essential” properties, such as atomic numbers, or any other microphysical 
description.  
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2.
According to Chalmers’ interpretation of two-dimensionalism, 
concepts have two intensions, which are functions from truth conditions to 
possible worlds and vice versa. The intension that goes from the truth 
conditions in the actual world to the counterfactual worlds is the primary 
intension. The primary intension tells us what fixes the reference in the 
actual world. The secondary intension goes from possible worlds to truth 
conditions in the actual world and tells us how the reference in the counter-
factual world is fixed. In other words, a term S is verified in some possible 
world W considered as actual, if and only if its primary intension is true at 
W. A term S is satisfied in some possible world if and only if its secondary 
intension is true there. The two-dimensional semantics is here employed to 
show why the step from conceivability to metaphysical possibility in the 
case of (P =Q) works and why it breaks down in the case of (water =H2O). 
Let’s have a closer look at what is going on here. 
In order to utilize his interpretation of two-dimensional semantics, 
Chalmers distinguishes several kinds of conceivability. Conceivability is 
here to be understood as an epistemic notion. The first one is what he calls 
“prima facie conceivability”, which requires that the subject should not be 
able to rule out a hypothesis solely by a priori reasoning. The second one is 
ideal conceivability which goes a bit further in trying to abstract from the 
cognitive capacities of a subject, and claims that a hypothesis is ideally 
conceivable if it cannot be ruled out a priori even on ideal rational reflection 
(Chalmers 2009). 
 The opposite case from these two is the already mentioned example 
with a triangle - given the definition of triangles as geometrical bodies with 
three angles, conceivability of the triangles with four angles is ruled out a 
priori. 
These two kinds of conceivability are examples of negative conceiv-
ability. However, there is also a positive conceivability. This sort is best 
known from Descartes’s thought experiments (Descartes 1996). Positive 
prima facie conceivability is the case when a subject can imagine a situation 
that she takes to be coherent and as the one in which the hypothesis is true. 
As with negative conceivability, here we also have ideal positive conceiv-
ability. We say that a situation is ideally positively conceivable if its prima 
facie positive conceivability cannot be defeated. 
However, the most important kinds of conceivability according to 
Chalmers are primary and secondary conceivability. These two kinds of 
conceivability can be based on either positive or negative conceivability. 
What distinguishes them is not just an epistemic perspective or cognitive 
capacities, but also a sense in which we say something is conceivable. So, 
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we say, for example, that “water is not H2O” is primary conceivable, exactly 
as it is stated, that is, that water is actually NOT H2O (which in Kripkean 
terms means that the whole world is otherwise, not just water and H2O), 
whereas in the case of secondary possibility we take a sense of conceivable 
in which “water is not H2O” merely seems conceivable but is not conceiv-
able. An example for the sense in which we think of the secondary conceiv-
ability is to say that when we say “water is not H2O” we only mean that 
watery stuff (that seems like water) is not H2O, but water as we know it is 
still H2O. 
When we look at the distinction between primary and secondary 
conceivability in the light of the distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori knowledge, it is clear that primary conceivability can only be 
made plausible in the domain of the a priori. That is, a hypothesis is primary 
conceivable if it cannot be ruled out purely on a priori reasoning, without 
any reference to empirical or extra-linguistic knowledge. 
So what is the link between primary and secondary conceivability on 
the one side and metaphysical possibility on the other? 
The primary intension of the sentence “water is not H2O” ("!S 
hereafter) is true at the counterfactual world W considered as actual, and its 
secondary intension at W1, say our world considered as counterfactual, is 
false, because at our world water is H2O. To put it differently, a world 
verifies S iff its primary intension is true at that world, and a world satisfies 
S iff its secondary intension is true there considered from the actual world. 
So, in order to prove that these steps of inference in the conceivabili-
ty argument follow a priori, Chalmers’s reasoning is based on the distinc-
tion between primary conceivability and possibility and secondary conceiv-
ability and possibility. How does this work? We said that, for example, 
water is not H2O is primary conceivable and therefore primary possible 
because “water is H2O” is not an a priori truth. Knowledge of “water is 
H2O” is not based on the meaning of the terms, linguistic rules, etc, but it is 
an empirical discovery, which we then employ to understand meaning of the 
terms. So, for all we know water might have been something other than H2O 
in our world. Unlike the case of a triangle, wherein a four-angled triangle is 
simply incoherent even to conceive of, because if we grasped the meaning 
of the concept “triangle”, we know, without any reference to extra-linguistic 
or to empirical knowledge, that a four angle triangle is an incoherent 
concept, and therefore not possible. So when we say “water is not H2O” is 
possible, it only means that there is nothing in our knowledge that would 
contradict to this statement prima facie, in a sense, this is not a statement 
about just water and H2O, but the statement about the whole world and its 
nomological structure. Now, Chalmers wants to show that if we apply the 
conceivability argument to the case of water/H2O, what is actually claimed 
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simply leads to inconsistency, by showing that although in the case of water/
H2O the statement “water is not H2O” is prima facie conceivable, thus 
primary possible, it is not conceivable and therefore not possible in the sense 
in which water is still H2O and there is some watery stuff that has the same 
macro properties of water, but which is not H2O, that is “water is not H2O” 
is not secondary possible. In the case of primary possibility, if water was not 
H2O but otherwise, then as Kripke puts it, the whole world would be other-
wise and the statement “water is not H2O” would be true. This is why two-
dimensional analysis comes very handy in these complicated cases. We 
need the secondary possibility to see what is going on with the secondary 
intension considered from some centred world. 
Let us see the structure of the argument with natural kinds like water 
and H2O. Let S be the proposition that water is not H2O.
1) S is conceivable;
 • This premise says that prima facie (it could not be ruled out a 
priori) it is conceivable that water is not H2O.
 2) If S is conceivable, S is 1- possible;
 • This premise says that if the statement is prima facie conceivable, 
then it is primary possible. 
 3) If S is 1- possible, then S is 2-possible;
 • This premise says that if the proposition “water is not H2O” were 
primary possible, then it would be secondary possible, which is not true in 
this case. 
Whereas in the case of the phenomenal the argument goes right 
through, from primary possibility to secondary possibility, and given the 
physicalist commitment thesis, the conclusion is not compatible with it - 
therefore physicalism is false.  Let us have that argument formalized as well:
4) (P&"!Q) is conceivable;
5) If (P&"!Q) is conceivable, (P&"!Q) is 1- possible;
6) If (P&"!Q) is 1- possible, then (P&"!Q) is 2-possible ;
7) If (P&"!Q) is 2-possible, materialism is false;
8) Therefore, materialism is false. 
So what is going on here compared to the water/H2O case? The 
argument here says that if a hypothesis is conceivable then it is primary 
possible, in another words it is not possible to rule out that hypothesis solely 
on the ground of a priori reasoning. This is the point where epistemic and 
modal principles meet, because if a conceived hypothesis is not possible to 
rule out a priori, then it is possible. This is the meaning of primary possibili-
ty, or the link between conceivability and possibility in Kripkean terms, 
which has been criticized in particular for this step. In an attempt to block 
these principle objection, Chalmers goes further in claiming that although 
the statement “water is not H2O” is primary possible, the identity of water 
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with H2O is established only a posteriori; however, once established as an 
identity it holds necessary. We might say that there are no a priori reasons 
that would contradict to conceiving of a situation in which water is not H2O 
in a strict sense (something other than H2O plays the water role) - this is a 
sense of the primary possibility – but it is not possible that water is H2O in 
the actual world and yet something else in a counterfactual world - this is the 
sense of the secondary possibility. This distinction clearly shows that 
primary conceivability does not lead to secondary possibility in the case of 
“water is not H2O”. However, “water is not H2O” is compatible with the 
inferences from primary conceivability to primary possibility and from 
secondary conceivability to secondary possibility. 
The argument against the identity of water and H2O breaks down 
when it comes to the inference from primary conceivability to secondary 
possibility, because the statement has the primary and secondary intensions 
that do not coincide. In other words it is not coherent to think of the situation 
in which a world W1 verifies the statement’s primary intension and a world 
W2 satisfies its secondary intension, given that they are separated (do not 
coincide), that is it is not coherent to hold that water at W1 is H2O and water 
at W2 is XYZ, since “water is H2O” is verified at W1 it cannot be XYZ. On 
the other hand, in the case of phenomenal the primary and secondary 
intensions of the statement do coincide, which in effect allows for the 
inference from primary possibility to secondary conceivability, and further 
to secondary possibility. This is so because, as Kripke noted, in the case of 
phenomenal there is no dissociation between appearance and reality, to 
paraphrase him: pain is identified with its immediate quality, i.e. for him 
how it appears to be in pain subjectively is to be in pain. To put it into more 
technical terms, dissociations between water and H2O, or between heat and 
molecular motion, seem conceivable, but they are only primary conceivable, 
thus primary possible, because their meanings have two modal dimensions, 
one that goes from the possible world to truth values or primary intension, 
which tells us what plays the water role in the centred world; and the other 
intension that goes from truth values to possible worlds or the secondary 
intension. Now, since in the case of natural kind terms, primary and sec-
ondary intensions do not coincide, it is because of the way in which we learn 
about their primary intensions (objective, third person perspective), in the 
case of phenomenal consciousness primary and secondary intensions 
collapse into one, because of the immediacy of phenomenal knowledge 
which dissolves the distinction between appearance and reality, in a sense 
that whatever properties of our experience appear to us, they are not merely 
appearing, they are real. In other words, for Kripke, painfulness of pain is its 
essential property, and when when we conceive of a situation in which C-
fiber firing is not pain, we can’t have an alternative explanation for this 
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situation as have in the case of heat and molecular motion. Therefore if it 
seems that the identity between pain and C-fiber firing can fall apart it does 
fall apart. 
What is going on in the case of (P =Q) is that it seems that both W1 
and W2 verify the statement. In a sense primary and secondary intensions of 
the statement “the phenomenal is not neurobiological” seem to coincide. 
That is the reason why the two-dimensional argument in this case goes 
through from primary possibility to secondary conceivability and further to 
secondary possibility. This argument structure purports to be saying that 
both statements - “pain=C fiber firing” and “C fiber firing =pain”- seem to 
be true, which is a contradiction. 
To put it in other words, in the case of natural kind terms, like 
“water” or “heat”, there seem to be a clear dissociation between the real 
nature of things and how they appear in our experience, i.e. we can imagine 
that something might look like water or heat whereas in fact it is not. Since 
the identity statement  “water is H2O” is not based on a priori knowledge, 
there is no a priori contradiction in conceiving of a situation in which water 
is not H2O, and thus if the hypothesis cannot be ruled out a priori, then it is 
possible. What makes it break down is the fact that given the a posteriori 
necessity of the identity statement  “water is H2O”, it is not possible that 
water is something else at W2 and still H2O at W1. However, what is 
possible is that if water was something else in the actual  (centred) world, 
then its primary intension would be fixed to whatever that “something else” 
is, to whatever plays the water role in the counterfactual scenario. In this 
case the statement “water is not H2O” would be true in the actual world. But 
this only means that the whole world would be otherwise. This makes a 
strong case, then, that primary and secondary intensions of phenomenal 
terms do in fact coincide. This in effect makes the two-dimensional argu-
ment involving the phenomenal/neurobiological to go through to the sec-
ondary possibility, which ultimately means that physicalism leads to contra-
diction, assuming that the primary and the secondary intensions of phenom-
enal terms coincide. 
3.
My criticism of this account is focused on two points. One is that 
Chalmers does not provide any argument in support of the claim that 
coinciding of the primary intensions occurs in all identity statements that 
involve concepts which are based on distinct modes of presentation. In other 
words, he believes that in the case of natural kinds the counterfactual 
situations are conceivable but not metaphysically possible because the 
primary intensions of the concepts involved diverge. Whereas in the case of 
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psychophysical identity primary and secondary intensions coincide and 
therefore what is conceivable is ipso facto metaphysically possible. But this 
does not follow necessary from his account of the two-dimensional seman-
tics. Conceivability of an identity falling apart does not necessarily stem 
from the diverging primary intensions of the concepts involved. Some 
concepts, such as phenomenal concepts, may refer directly and thus won’t 
have a priori connections with their referents. If this is the case then it would 
be conceivable that identity involving such concepts can fall apart but it 
would not mean it is metaphysically possible for them to fall apart. 
If this is right, then it casts a serious doubt about whether this ac-
count of two-dimensional semantics is universal applicable to the natural 
kinds. Apparently Chalmers (Chalmers 1996, 2009) and Chalmers and 
Jackson (Chalmers and Jackson 2000) maintain that a posteriori necessity of 
identities involving natural kinds stems from two sources: a priori analysis 
of meaning, i.e. conceptual analysis, or a priori derivation of any macro-
physical fact from the body of complete microphysical descriptions.  Block 
and Stalnaker (Block and Stalnaker 1999, pp. 14-16) use an example of the 
“explanatory gap” in explaining life to argue against this point. If Chalmers 
and Jackson were right, then we would be analyzing the concept of “life” in 
terms of functional roles such as digestion, reproduction, locomotion, 
respiration and so forth. However, it might have happened that some living 
organisms never digested, respired, reproduced or moved but still being 
alive. Perhaps they were based on some other processes to sustain life, e.g. 
some creatures made out of pure energy so they never had a need to digest, 
respire or reproduce to be considered alive. If this is right then the analysis 
of life in terms of digestion, reproduction, locomotion, respiration, etc., 
would not be a priori. It would merely describe how living things in our 
known universe function, but that would by no means imply that all living 
things function in the same way. As Block and Stalnaker put it: “Closing the 
explanatory gap in the case of life has nothing to do with any analytic 
definition of 'life', but rather is a matter of showing how living things around 
here work” (Block and Stalnaker 1999, p. 15). Indeed, the analysis of 
meaning in terms of the descriptions of the causal or functional roles can’t 
be a priori and it also can’t serve universally as a basis for the necessity of 
identities in the case of natural kinds. 
Another problematic issue with Chalmers’ take on the two-dimen-
sional semantics is the notion of a priori derivation of any random macro-
physical fact from the complete microphysical descriptions. In our case it is 
a lack of such derivation for phenomenal concepts. Namely, Chalmers and 
Jackson (Chalmers and Jackson 2000) claim that an explanation of identity 
that involves natural kinds has to include two steps, one which is a priori, 
based on some a priori analysis of meaning, as it was already explained, and 
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the other has to be a microphysical description. However, Block and Stal-
naker (Block and Stalnaker 1999) show that in some cases either a macro-
physical concept is not inferred from the microphysical description or if it is 
based on the microphysical description then the inference is not a priori. 
They use the following example. 
9) 60 percent of the earth is covered with H2O.
10) H2O is the stuff that plays the right kind of causal role in explain-
ing our use of the word 'water'.
11) Therefore, 60 percent of the earth is covered with water.
The assumption must be that the inference from 9) and 10) to 11) is 
now mediated by the following conceptual analysis:
12) Water is the stuff that plays the right kind of causal role in 
explaining our use of the word 'water'.” (Block and Stalnaker 1999, pp. 
25-26).
The crucial step in the argument that is supposed to grant that 11) 
follows a priori from the premises 9) and 10) is of course hidden premise 
12) However, 12) is not a conceptual truth about the meaning of the word 
“water”. At best it is an abbreviation of an a posteriori and empirical analy-
sis of the right kind of causal role of water.  For all we know some other 
liquid might have played that role. 
If this kind of conceptual analysis is available for natural kinds, then 
it is also available for cases involving phenomenal concepts. Furthermore, it 
certainly does not constitute a difference between the conceptual analysis of 
natural kinds and the analysis of phenomena concepts.
In conclusion, Chalmers’ approach to fortifying the entailment from 
conceivability to metaphysical possibility by using two-dimensional modal 
semantics does not succeed for two reasons. One is that there is no justifica-
tion for the assumption that diverging primary intensions are the only 
ground for the necessity of the identity. Phenomenal concepts don’t have a 
priori connections to their referents and still can establish necessary identi-
ties. This in effect undermines the very idea of relying on the analysis of 
primary intensions in examining necessity of certain statements. The second 
reason is that conceptual analysis does not help us to derive concept’s a 
priori component from the microphysical descriptions. It turns out that this 
kind of analysis is not universally applicable to explanations of identities of 
all natural kinds and even if it was there is nothing that prevents us from 
using it for the psychophysical identity. 
12.08.2011. Beograd
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DANIEL KOSTI!
DVODIMENZIONALNI ARGUMENT
PROTIV FIZIKALIZMA I POJMOVNA ANALIZA
(Apstrakt)
Ovaj tekst se bavi dvodimenzionalnim argumentom protiv fizikalizma. Tekst 
ispituje ulogu primarnih i sekundarnih intenzija u logi!koj derivaciji metafizi!ke 
mogu#nosti iz zamislivosti u modalnim argumentima protiv fizikalizma. U tekstu se 
dokazuje da ovaj pristup ima dva fatalna nedostatka. Jedan je da argument ne nudi 
opravdanje za tvrdnju da su primarne intenzije pojma koje se razilaze jedina osnova za 
nu$nost identiteta. Drugi je da pojmovna analiza ne uspeva da doka$e da su makro 
pojmovi a priori izvodivi iz potpunih mikrofizi!kih opisa. 
